Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body\u27s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade LIberalization by Ala\u27i, Padideh
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1999 
Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO 
Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade 
LIberalization 
Padideh Ala'i 
American University Washington College of Law, palai@wcl.american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ala'i, Padideh, "Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to 
a More Balanced Approach to Trade LIberalization" (1999). Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals. 811. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/811 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ 
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
American University International Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 4 Article 5
1999
Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An
Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a
More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization
Padideh Ala'i
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ala'I, Padideh. "Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced
Approach to Trade Liberalization." American University International Law Review 14, no. 4 (1999): 1129-1171.
FREE TRADE OR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE
WTO APPELLATE BODY'S SHIFT TO A
MORE BALANCED APPROACH TO TRADE
LIBERALIZATION
PADIDEH ALA'I*
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1130
I. HISTORY OF ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS .............. 1132
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS
FROM THE GATT 1947 PANEL DECISIONS TO THE
WTO APPELLATE BODY ................................ 1137
A. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX UNDER THE GATT 1947 1137
1. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salnon ("Herring and Salmon') ........ 1138
2. Thailand-Restrictions on hnportation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes ("Thailand-Cigarettes') ........ 1141
3. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna
I') ................................................... 1145
4. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna
II") .................................................. 1149
B. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX UNDER WTO/GATT
1994 ..................................................... 1154
1. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline ................................... 1155
2. United States-Inport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products ................................ 1162
1129
* Assistant Professor of Law, American University Washington College of
Law. The author wishes to express her gratitude to her students Evangeline de
Gracia and Cameron Pfeiffer for their research assistance.
1130 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. [14:1129
III. WHAT COURSE WILL THE APPELLATE BODY TAKE
IN THE FUTURE: FREE TRADE OR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT? ......................................... 1169
INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the evolution of the Article XX General Ex-
ceptions provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT 1994")' from its drafting history in 1946, to increasingly
1. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article XX of the GATT
1994 states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in the Agreement [GATT 1994], shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(c) relating to the importation of exportation of silver or gold;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsis-
tent with the provision of this agreement...
(e) relating to products of prison labor;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeo-
logical value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity
agreement ...;
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic material necessary to ensure essen-
tial quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when
the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a govern-
mental stabilization plan...;
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or in local short
supply ....
GATT, supra, art. XX.
Accompanying the creation of the WTO were a series of renegotiated trade
agreements, including an updated version of the GATT known as GATT 1994.
GATT 1994 incorporated in its entirety GATT 1947 with subsequent modifica-
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narrow interpretations by the GATT panels, and ultimately to the
more expansive interpretations by the World Trade Organization
Appellate Body ("Appellate Body") in United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ("Reformulated Gaso-
line") and United States-hnport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products3 ("Shrimp-Turtle") in 1996 and 1998.' Interpreta-
tion of Article XX by the Appellate Body indicates that the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") has taken the policies and interests that
are outside the realm of trade liberalization, such as the environment,
much more seriously than its GATT predecessor. In its decisions, the
Appellate Body has recognized that it is no longer possible for the
WTO to uphold the free trade goals of the GATT 1994, such as pro-
moting market access, above all other goals and concerns-e.g.,
health, the environment, and the objectives of sustainable develop-
ment.5
tions and understandings. Specifically, Article XX of GATT 1947 was not
amended or modified as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. Therefore,
Article XX of GATT 1994 or GATT 1947 are identical texts. See General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154.
2. Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 26, 1996, WTO Doc. No. \T/DS2JAB1R [here-
inafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report].
3. Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, WTO Doc. No. WT/DS58AB'R
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report].
4. Contrary to the Appellate Body, the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
Panels have interpreted Article XX narrowly. See WTO Dispute Panel Report on
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, May 15, 1998, WTO
Doc. WT/DS58/R, paras. 7.24-7.61 [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report];
WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, paras. 6.20-6.43
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report]; see also infra note 17 and ac-
companying text (noting that the language of Article XX has remained unchanged
since 1947).
5. This essay concentrates on Appellate Body decisions. The DSB panels ap-
pear to be unaware of this change in attitude towards Article XX interests from the
GATT to the WTO. They continue to put free trade above all other concerns. The
relationship of the panel system to the Appellate Body is beyond the scope of this
article but has been addressed in other articles. See Sympositm on the First Three
Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32 INT'L LAWYER 609, 609-11
1999] 1131
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This essay maintains that although the Appellate Body held in
Reformulated Gasoline and Shrimp-Turtle that the environmental
measures at issue were not justified under Article XX, the final
holding of the Appellate Body should not overshadow the positive
and important implications of its analysis for the future of Article
XX. After narrow interpretation by GATT panels, the Appellate
Body has expanded the scope of Article XX through the application
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.6 As a result, it is
now within the realm of possibility that a governmental measure,
otherwise inconsistent with a substantive provision of the GATT
1994, can be justified as an Article XX exception.
This essay is divided into three parts. Part I reviews the drafting
history of Article XX of the GATT 1994 and the important role the
United States played in that process. Part II traces the evolution of
Article XX by looking at selected GATT panel and Appellate Body
decisions that interpret Article XX exceptions both under the GATT
1947 panel procedure and the current WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding ("DSU"). 7 The analysis is limited to the discussions of
Article XX in each decision. Part III concludes by briefly addressing
the growing importance of Article XX exceptions within the frame-
work of the WTO Agreement and the unique and increasingly im-
portant role of the Appellate Body.
I. HISTORY OF ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS
The general exceptions listed in Article XX of the GATT 1994
can be traced back to the 1927 International Agreement for the Sup-
pression of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.8 Subse-
(1998) (reviewing the first three years of the new WTO dispute settlement system).
6. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
7. For an overview of the GATT 1947 and 1994 systems and their differ-
ences, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE
SETTLEMENTS 66-92, 177-98 (1997).
8. International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions, League of Nations Doc. C.559 M.201 1927.II[B] (1927).
Article 4 provides an exception for, among other things, rules and regulations that
are "issued on grounds of public health" or "imposed for moral or humanitarian
1132 [14:1129
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quently, the drafters incorporated the same general exceptions' dur-
ing negotiations for the creation of the International Trade Organiza-
tion ("ITO")."' As the drafting history of the ITO Charter indicates,
the drafting of the General Exceptions provision-which ultimately
became Article XX of the GATT 1947"-was controversial due to
reasons... ." Id. art. 4.
9. For the full drafting history of the ITO Charter general exceptions, see Re-
port of the First Session of the Preparator
, 
Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/33 (1946) [hereinafter London Draft Charter] (illustrating that general ex-
ceptions were considered, but were not drafted); Report of the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annexure I, at 52, 60, U.N. Doc. EPCiT/33 (1946)
[hereinafter United States Draft Charter] (illustrating draft exceptions); Report of
the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 2d. Sess., at 31, 77, U.N. Doc.
E/PC/T/34/Rev. 1 (1947) [hereinafter New York Draft Charter]; Report of the Sec-
ond Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., at 7-65, U.N. Doc. E/PCIT/186
[hereinafter Geneva Draft Charter]; Final Act and Related Documents of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.S. ESCOR, at 33, U.N.
Doe. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
10. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, there was agreement among the
participants that protectionism and restrictive trade policies had led to the world-
wide recession, which had in turn caused World War 11. As a result, partly to fore-
stall history from repeating itself and partly to rebuild the economies of many parts
of the world-specifically Europe and Japan-after the devastation of World War
II, the Conference drafted outlines for three "Bretton Woods" institutions. Two of
these institutions, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF') and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD" or "World Bank"), began op-
erating in Washington, D.C. in 1946. The third institution was the International
Trade Organization ("ITO"). Negotiations for the creation of the ITO began in
1946 but the organization itself never came into existence, largely due to the fact
that the United States Congress refused to ratify it. As a result, the General
Agreement for Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), which was originally envisioned to be
a subsidiary agreement and part of the ITO, was concluded as an executive agree-
ment and was left to fill the void that the failed ITO had left. See JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35 (2d ed. 1997).
11. The GATT was never contemplated to be an organization and its was im-
plemented on a "provisional basis" for almost fifty years. Because the GATT was
not an institution, signatory countries were referred to as Contracting Parties and
not Members. Under the WTO, all signatory countries that have successfully
joined and acceded to the organization are called Members. See generally WTO
Membership (visited Feb. 14, 1999) <http:llvwv.wto.org> (listing the 134 Mem-
bers of the WTO).
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the scope of the exceptions proposed under the Article and the "di-
vergence of national practices" with regard to the issues it addressed.
This difference in views was explained in a report by the Preparatory
Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment in 1947:
A substantial degree of agreement among the members of the Preparatory
Committee was reached on questions of the principle underlying these
[General Exception] provisions. However, as was to be expected, there
were numerous differences of opinion, and a number of reservations were
made on account of national variations in the practice of detailed admini-
stration. 2
Ultimately, the drafters of the ITO Charter used the General Ex-
ceptions provision proposed by the United States in its draft of the
ITO Charter, which had been included as "Annexure II" in the Lon-
don Draft Charter. 3 The United States draft proposed the following
introductory language: "Nothing in Chapter IV [on commercial pol-
icy] of this [ITO] Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption
of enforcement by any Member of measures."' 4
12. London Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 11.
13. See id.; see also infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing opposi-
tion by certain countries to the adoption of the Article XX exceptions).
14. United States Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 60. The full text of the Gen-
eral Exceptions provisions from the United States Draft Charter provided:
Nothing in Chapter IV, article 32 [on commercial policy] of this (ITO] Charter shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;
(c) relating to fusionable materials;
(d) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military es-
tablishment;
(e) in time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating to the protec-
tion of the essential security interests of a Member;
(f) relating to the importation or exportation of gold and silver;
(g) necessary to induce compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of Chapter IV, such as those relating to customs enforcement, de-
ceptive practices, and the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights;
(h) relating to prison-made goods;
1134 [14:1129
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The proposed unqualified introductory language immediately
raised concerns that the provision would be subject to abuse. For ex-
ample, delegations from the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union feared that "the stipulations 'to protect animal or
plant life or health' would be misused for indirect protectionism.""
Therefore, in order to combat abuse of exceptions and, in particular,
to prohibit the use of the exceptions for protectionist ends, the intro-
ductory clause was amended as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures not be applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in Chapter V [General Com-
mercial Policy] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
16
of any Member of measures....
This amended introductory language became the introductory lan-
guage for Article XX of the GATT and remains today, unchanged,
the introductory provision-or chapeau-of Article XX of the
GATT 1994.17
(i) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological
value;
(j) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
taken pursuant to international agreements or are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption:
(k) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United Nations Charter for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. or
(1) imposed in accordance with a determination or recommendation of the Organiza-
tion [ITO] formulated under paragraphs 2. 6, or 7 of Article 55 [Powers and Duties of
the Conference].
Id.
15. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 563
(1995) (citing U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.11/32 (1946) (note of the Netherlands and the
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union)) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX].
"Indirect protectionism is an undesirable and dangerous phenomenon. Many times
stipulations to 'protect animal or plant life or health' are misused for indirect pro-
tection. It is recommended to insert a clause which prohibits expressly [the use of]
such measures [to] constitute an indirect protection ... " Id.
16. New York Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 31 (emphasis added).
17. Article XX was not amended as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements
or the creation of the WTO. Therefore, the introductory language of Article XX
1999] 1135
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As far as the specific subparagraphs under Article XX are con-
cerned, almost all, with the exception of subparagraphs (i)"8 and (j),19
can be traced back to the United States Draft ITO Charter." Further-
more, subparagraph (g)21 was included at the insistence of the United
States so that it could continue to institute export controls in connec-
tion with domestic conservation measures." In sum, the drafting
history of Article XX indicates that, first, participants in the multilat-
eral trading system have always recognized that there are equally le-
gitimate interests and policies other than "free trade" that govern-
ments often must pursue. Second, Article XX has been controversial
from the very beginning because of the divergence of national prac-
tices in areas listed under Article XX.23 Third, all of the Article XX
exceptions invoked to date-namely, subparagraphs (b), (d), and
(g)-were United States proposals,24 and it was the United States that
specifically insisted on the inclusion of subparagraph (g).2" Fourth,
countries expressed concern that Article XX would be used for pro-
tectionist ends, and, therefore, amended the introductory provision of
Article XX in order to prevent such abuse.
1994 remains as it was originally drafted in 1947.
18. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(i) ("[I]nvolving restrictions on exports of
domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities so such materials to a
domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such ma-
terials is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan").
19. See id. art. XX(j) ("[E]ssential to the acquisition or distribution of products
in general or short local supply").
20. See id. art. XX; see also United States Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 52.
21. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g).
22. See CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 182 (Ronald Steel ed.,
1972) (explaining the drafting history of Article XX(g).
23. Compare United States Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 60, with London
Draft Charter, supra note 9, at 33-34.
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing fears of other coun-
tries concerning Article XX); see also United States Draft Charter, supra note 9, at
60.
25. See WILCOX, supra note 22, at 182.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE XX
EXCEPTIONS FROM THE GATT 1947 PANEL
DECISIONS TO THE WTO APPELLATE BODY
A. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX UNDER THE GATT 1947
The burden of proof has always been on the party invoking an Ar-
ticle XX exception to justify a GATT-inconsistent measure. As the
following cases demonstrate, 6 however, the traditional analysis of
the provisions of Article XX by the GATT panels made this a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, burden to meet. The GATT panels held that
Article XX must be interpreted narrowly and that none of the Article
XX exceptions in themselves create an obigaton.' Therefore, it was
not the duty of the panels to examine Article XX exceptions unless
they were invoked by the parties to the dispute." The panels did
hold, however, that invocation of one or more of the Article XX ex-
ceptions does not constitute ipso facto an admission that the meas-
ures in question would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATT.14
26. See, e.g., Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. Lf6268-35 S/98 [hereinafter GATT Her-
ring and Salmon Report]; Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. DSIO/R-37St200 [hereinafter
GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report]; United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. 39S/155 [hereinafter GATT Tuna I Report];
United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT Tuna II Report].
27. See GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 15, at 563; see also GATT Sec-
retariat, GA7T/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article A,, Para-
graphs (b), (d) and (g) of GATT, WT/CTEIW/53IRev.l, par. 5 (Oct. 26, 1998).
28. See GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para. 5.22 (summarizing the his-
tory of Article XX).
[A]rticle XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations under other pro-
visions of the General Agreement, and not a positive rule establishing obligations in it-
self. Therefore, the practice of panels has been to interpret Article XX narrowly, to
place the burden on the party invoking Article XX to justify its invocation, and not to
examine Article XX exceptions unless invoked.
Id.
29. See id. (stating, "[a] party to a dispute could argue in the alternative that
Article XX might apply, without this argument constituting ipso facto an admis-
sion that the measures in question would otherwise be inconsistent with the Gen-
eral Agreement."); see also GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 15, at 563.
1999] 1137
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The panels provided that the parties can argue Article XX exceptions
"in the alternative" and that indeed arguments in the alternative were
necessary for the "efficient operation of the dispute settlement proc-
ess.
,3°
1. Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon ("Herring and Salmon')
In Herring and Salmon, the United States brought a complaint
against Canada, stating that Canadian laws and regulations restrict-
ing exports from Canada of unprocessed sockeye salmon, pink
salmon, and herring3' were inconsistent with the obligations of Can-
ada pursuant to Article XI of the GATT, 32 and that Article XX ex-
ceptions did not justify any of those regulations." The United States
30. GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para 5.22.
31. There are three relevant laws and regulations. First, the Canadian Fisheries
Act of 1970, sub-section 34(j), which provides that "the Governor in council may
make regulations for carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Act in par-
ticular, but without restricting the generality of the foregoing, may make regula-
tions... (j) respecting the export of fish or any part thereof from Canada .. " Id.
para. 2.1 (citing The Fisheries Act, R.S.C., ch. F-14, section 34(j) (1970) (Can.) (as
amended)). Second, the Regulations Respecting Commercial Fishing for Salmon
in the Waters of British Columbia and Canadian Fisheries Waters in the Pacific
Ocean, paragraph 6, which prohibit the exportation from Canada of any sockeye or
pink salmon unless it is "canned, salted, smoked, dried, pickled or frozen and has
been inspected in accordance with the Fish Inspection Act." Id. para. 2.2 (citing
Regulation of Nov. 7, 1978, Ch. 823, 1978 C.R.C. 3900 (Can.)). Third, the Regu-
lations Respecting Fishing for Herring in Canadian Fisheries Waters on the Pacific
Coast, paragraph 24(1), which prohibit the exportation or attempt to export any
"food herring, roe herring, herring roe or herring spawn on kelp unless: (a) it is
canned, salted, dried, smoked, pickled or frozen; and (b) it has been inspected by
an inspector designated pursuant to section 17 of the Fish Inspection Act." Id. para.
2.3 (citing Regulation of May 2, 1984, Pt. II, 1984 C. Gaz. 1693 (Can.)).
32. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XI. Article XI refers to the general elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions and provides in pertinent part:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Id.
33. The United States also argued that the measure at issue was not justified
under Article XI:2(b) of the GATT 1947, which provides an exception to Article
1138 [14:1129
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argued that "the purpose and effect of Canada's export restrictions
was not to conserve resources or ensure product quality, [but] rather
the purpose was to protect Canadian processors and help maintain
employment in British Columbia."4 Canada, on the other hand,
maintained that the measure in question had been in effect since the
early decades of the century and that the measures at issue here were
"an integral part of a complex and longstanding system of fishery re-
sources management [and, more specifically,] an integral part of the
conservation and management programme for herring and pink and
sockeye salmon."35 Canada further asserted that the export measures
at issue were justified under Article XX(g), which provides an ex-
ception to GATT obligations for measures "relating to the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made ef-
fective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and
consumption. 36
In analyzing Article XX(g), the panel started with the actual lan-
guage of subparagraph (g), which together with the introductory pro-
vision provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.37
XI. A discussion of Article XI:2(b) is outside the scope of this article.
34. GATT Herring and Salmon Report, supra note 26, para. 3.11. To prove this
point the United States quoted language from a 1980 Canadian Department of
Fisheries and Ocean Report which stated that "export restrictions were in place for
the purpose of 'promoting jobs for Canadians (by increasing the amount of proc-
essing done in Canada)."' Id. Canada responded that the quotation was "taken out
of context" and that the measures at issue were "multipurpose." See id. para. 3.12.
35. Supra note 26, para. 3.5.
36. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g).
37. Id.
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The panel agreed with the parties that salmon and herring stocks
are "exhaustible natural resources,"38 but held that the Canadian law
was not "related to" the conservation of salmon and herring nor was
it "in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption.39 The panel analyzed the phrases "relating to" and "in
conjunction with" as they are used in subparagraph (g). It concluded
that "relating to" means that a measure must be "primarily aimed at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource" and "in con-
junction with" means that the measure in question must be "primar-
ily aimed at rendering effective the domestic production restric-
tions., 40 The panel held that Canada had failed to prove that the
export restrictions were primarily aimed at conserving salmon and
herring or that the measure was primarily aimed at rendering effec-
tive a domestic restriction. Having failed the "primarily aimed at"
test, the panel found that the Canadian law violated Article XI: 1 of
the GATT and was not justified under Article XX(g).41 Having inter-
preted the words "relating to" and "in conjunction with" to mean
"primarily aimed at," the panel concluded that it was not necessary
to analyze the Canadian law at issue either under the requirements of
the Article XX chapeau or in relation to the overall purpose and aim
of Article XX.
38. GATT Herring and Salmon Report, supra note 26, para. 4.4.
39. See id. para. 4.4.
40. See id. para. 4.6. The panel held that the terms "in conjunction with" in Ar-
ticle XX(g) "had to be interpreted in a way that ensures that the scope of possible
actions under that provision corresponds to the purpose for which it was included
in the General Agreement." The Panel further stated that although subparagraph
(g),
does not cover only measures that are necessary or essential for the conservation of an
exhaustible natural resources but a wider range of measures. However, the preamble of
Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agree-
ment is not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely
to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit
of policies aimed at conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Id. para. 4.6
41. See id. para. 5.1.
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2. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes ("Thailand-Cigarettes ")
In Thailand-Cigarettes, the United States brought a complaint
against Thailand '2 claiming that Thailand's Tobacco Act of 1966
("Tobacco Act") was inconsistent with Thailand's obligation under
Article XI:1 of the GATT.4' The Tobacco Act of 1966 stated that
"the importation... of tobacco is prohibited except by license of the
Director-General." The Director-General of Thailand had not
granted any import licenses for cigarettes in the past ten years.'5 The
United States argued that none of the Article XX exceptions covered
Thailand's prohibition, including Article XX(b), which states that:
"nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ...(b)
necessary to protect human ... life or health."'
The United States argued that Article XX does not cover the
measure because no safeguards comparable to an import prohibition
existed with respect to domestic cigarettes. Referring to the Article
XX chapeau, the United States asserted that the intention of the
drafters of the GATT was to ensure that "measures which a Con-
tracting Party seeks to justify under the provisions of Article
XX(b) ... reflect similar domestic safeguards," and that the draft-
ing history of the chapeau supports this position. Furthermore, the
chapeau was amended to state that under Article XX a "measure
must not be disguised restrictions on international trade."" The
42. See GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26, par. 1 (explaining
that the United States wanted consultations with Thailand, but requested a panel
and set forth a complaint when consultations failed). Prior to the formation of the
GATT panel the United States had also threatened Thailand with retaliation
against Thai exports to the United States under Section 301 of the United States
Trade Act of 1974. See id. para. 34.
43. See id. para. 16 (arguing that since 1966 Thailand's licensing regime for
cigarettes was inconsistent with Article XI).
44. Tobacco Act of 1966 (Thailand), quoted in GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Re-
port, supra note 26, para. 63.
45. See GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26,para. 6.
46. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(b).
47. GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26, para. 22.
48. Id.
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United States did not question the health hazards of smoking. Rather
it asserted that the true intention of the Tobacco Act was to protect
the Thai domestic tobacco industry. The United States stated that,
"Thailand could not argue that the ban on imports was necessary to
protect human life or health since domestic production, sales and ex-
ports of cigarettes and tobacco remained at high levels. '49
In sum, the United States argued that any measure that could be
taken in pursuance of an Article XX(b) objective should be taken on
a national treatment basis and Thailand, like other countries, should
pursue the objective of seeking to prevent an increase in the number
of smokers in ways that are more consistent with the GATT. 0
Thailand responded by stating that Article XX(b) "reflected the
recognition that public health protection is a basic responsibility of
governments,"" and that the Tobacco Act was exactly the type of
measure covered by that exception because:
the production and consumption of tobacco undermined the objectives set
out in the Preamble of the General Agreement [of 1947] which were: to
raise the standard of living, ensure full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, develop
the full use of the resources of the world and expand the production and
exchange of goods."
In other words, Thailand argued, smoking tobacco lowered the
standard of living, increased sickness, and led to billions of dollars
spent on medical costs, thereby reducing real income." Thailand also
noted that the Tobacco Act was only one part of a comprehensive
national program for control of tobacco use that it had developed in
compliance with the resolutions of the World Health Organization
("WHO"), and therefore it was clearly based on health concerns.14
49. Id. para. 23
50. See id. para. 30 (setting forth the argument made by the United States con-
cerning Thailand's failure to meet the obligations of GATT).
51. Id. para. 24
52. Id. para. 21.
53. See GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26, para. 21 (discussing
Thailand's argument that the Tobacco Act was based on health concerns).
54. See id. paras. 54-56 (explaining that the WHO supported the position of the
Government of Thailand in its submissions solicited by the GATT panel). The
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Thailand denied that the objective of the Tobacco Act was to pro-
tect the domestic cigarette industry.:" It argued that it did not ban
domestic cigarette production because of the fear that a total ban on
cigarettes would lead to increased production and consumption of
more harmful narcotic drugs. Thailand distinguished foreign ciga-
rettes from domestic ones on the following grounds: (1) American
cigarettes are specifically targeted at women while Thai cigarettes
are not; (2) experience in Asia and Latin America has shown that
once a market is opened, the United States cigarette industry exerts
great efforts to force governments to accept its terms and conditions,
which undermine public health, circumvent advertising bans, and use
modem marketing techniques to boost sales; and (3) cigarettes
manufactured in the United States may be more harmful than Thai
cigarettes because United States cigarette companies use unknown
chemicals in cigarettes, in part to compensate for lower tar and nico-
tine levels.56
The GATT panel decided in favor of the United States and found
that the import prohibition was not "necessary" under Article XX(b).
WHO confirmed that Thailand had adopted the recommendations of the WHO's
Expert Committee on Smoking Control Strategies in Developing Countries, in-
cluding prohibition of all advertising and promotion of tobacco products. See id.
para. 56. The WHO also supported Thailand's position by asserting the following:
(1) experience in Latin America and Asia has shown that opening of closed ciga-
rette markets dominated by a state tobacco monopoly resulted in an increase in
smoking; (2) American cigarettes (unlike Thai cigarettes) included special brands
aimed at the female market and because they had lower tar and nicotine level they
made it easier for women to inhale the smoke and some even made appeal to
women by the addition of perfume and their long and slender shape "to suggest
that smoking would result in thinness;" (3) the type of cigarettes available in
Thailand and locally produced are harsher and smoked with less facility and there-
fore less likely to be used by women or adolescents; (4) adult rate of smoking in
Thailand had declined since 1981 as a result of the adoption of WHO recom-
mended smoke control policies; and (5) as other cases in Asian countries had
shown, if multinational tobacco companies entered the Thai market, cigarette con-
sumption, death and disease attributable to such consumption, will increase be-
cause local, poorly-financed public health programs would be unable to compete
with the marketing budgets of the multinational tobacco firms. Id. paras. 52-56.
55. In its defense, Thailand showed that there was a ban on advertising for both
domestic and foreign cigarettes and that no new cigarette factories had been built
in the last twelve years that would have expanded the state-controlled cigarette in-
dustry. GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26, para. 33.
56. See id. paras. 27, 28, 34.
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In coming to this conclusion, the panel adopted the "least-GATT-
inconsistent" test that it had previously applied to interpret the word
"necessary" under Article XX(d).7 The panel explained this princi-
ple in the following manner:
[I]mport restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be
"necessary" in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative
measures consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent with
it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its
health policy objectives .... 5'
The panel went on to conclude that Thailand had failed to meet the
least-GATT-inconsistent test because there were other measures that
it could have legitimately invoked.59
In Thailand-Cigarettes, the panel limited the basis of its decision
to the interpretation of the word "necessary" in subparagraph (b),
using by analogy the interpretation of the word "necessary" in sub-
paragraph (d).' In interpreting the word "necessary," the panel gave
no consideration to the subject matter of the measure in question,
namely tobacco. There is no indication that the panel would have
interpreted the word "necessary" any differently if another product
was involved. Furthermore, there is no discussion by the panel of the
requirements of the Article XX chapeau to determine whether the
Tobacco Act resulted in "arbitrary or unjustified discrimination," or
was an attempt at "disguised restriction," or protectionism. The panel
makes no reference to the language of the GATT 1947 preamble that
Thailand had referred to in support of the cigarette import prohibi-
tion.6' Notably the narrowness of the interpretation and analysis did
57. See id. para. 74.
58. Id. para. 75.
59. The panel suggested that Thailand could use strict, non-discriminatory la-
beling and ingredient disclosure regulations to control the quality of cigarettes. See
id. para. 77. The panel also examined the possible use of a ban on the advertise-
ment of both domestic and foreign cigarettes. See id. para. 78. The panel even sug-
gested the use of governmental monopolies to regulate the overall supply of ciga-
rettes. See id. para. 79.
60. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
61. See generally GATT Thailand-Cigarettes Report, supra note 26.
The production and consumption of tobacco undermined the objectives set out in the
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not prevent the panel from commenting on how the government of
Thailand should have achieved its stated public health policy objec-
tive.62
3. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna I")
In Tuna 1, Mexico brought an action against the United States for
violation of its GATT obligations under Articles XI and XIII as a re-
sult of the application of the United States' Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 1972 ("MMPA"). 63 Mexico argued that the relevant pro-
visions of the MMPA were not covered by the exceptions in Article
XX subparagraphs (b) and (g).
The MMPA prohibited the importation of tuna or tuna products
into the United States that had been harvested by purse-seine nets in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean ("ETP").4 The MMPA defines
the ETP as the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by 40 degrees
north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west latitude,
and the coasts of North, Central and South America."' The basis for
this prohibition was that schools of tuna in the ETP often swim be-
low herds of dolphins. This means that the use of purse-seine nets' 6
Preamble of the General Agreement which were: to raise the standard of living, ensure
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, develop the full use of the resources of the world and expand the production
and exchange of goods.
Id. para. 21.
62. See id. paras. 77-81 (setting forth the suggestions of the Panel); see also
supra note 59.
63. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972).
64. See GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para. 2.1.
65. See id. para. 2.3.
66. See id. para. 2.1 (defining purse seine nets and how they are used for fish-
ing tuna). Purse seine nets are commonly used in commercial fisheries. See id.
Two vessels are necessary to use the net. The larger fishing vessel keeps one end
of the net attached to it, while a small boat (a "seine skiff') carries the other end
around a school of tuna. See id. Once the seine skiff encircles the school and meets
the larger vessel, it returns its end of the net to the larger vessel, which in turn
draws in the cables at the top and bottom of the net. This creates a "pursing" effect
as the net gathers the fish. See id.
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to catch tuna necessarily resulted in the incidental killing and injury
to dolphins, an endangered species."
The United States responded first that the MMPA was not a viola-
tion of the GATT because it subjected domestic United States fishing
vessels to the same requirements as those imposed on foreign ves-
sels. Therefore, GATT Article 111:4-national treatment- permitted
the measure in question, and Article XI-prohibition of quantitative
restrictions--did not apply to the measure at issue." In the alterna-
tive, the United States argued that the Article XX subparagraphs (b)
and (g) exceptions covered the MMPA.
The GATT panel in Tuna I found the national treatment argument
irrelevant to the MMPA provisions at issue. The panel held that the
measure in question was outside the scope of Article III because Ar-
ticle III is only applicable to measures involving "products," i.e.,
tuna, and not to measures involving a "process," i.e, the method of
catching tuna.69 Furthermore, the product that the law seeks to pro-
tect, namely, dolphins, is different than the product that was made
subject to quantitative restrictions, namely, tuna.
The United States argued that the MMPA was justified under Ar-
ticle XX(b) as "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health"7 ° because: (1) dolphins are a threatened species, (2) there is
credible scientific evidence that yellowfin tuna and dolphins can be
found in the same waters, (3) catching tuna does result in incidental
killing of dolphins, and (4) prohibiting the use of purse seine nets
can minimize the incidental killing of dolphins." Invoking the defi-
67. See id. para. 2.2 (arguing that fishermen intentionally locate dolphins and
use their large "purse seine" nets to encircle them with the expectation that tuna
will be found below the dolphins).
68. See id. paras. 3.11-3.16. Mexico on the other hand argued that Article 111:4
was not applicable to the measure at issue because the measure was not aimed at a
"product" but rather a "process," i.e., the process of catching tuna and that it was
therefore outside the scope of Article III and in violation of Article XI. See id.
para. 3.16. Clearly, the process/product distinction that the panel formulated in
Tuna I has had far reaching implications for any environmental measure, most of
which are directed at processes rather than products. See id.
69. GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, paras. 5.11-5.15.
70. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(b)
71. See id. para. 3.33.
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nition of "necessary" as previously interpreted in Thailand-
Cigarettes, the United States stated that:
the MMPA embargo was necessary to protect the life and health of dol-
phins. No alternative measure was available or had been proposed that
could reasonably be expected to achieve the objective of protecting the
lives or health of dolphins. Purse-seining for tuna in the ETP meant delib-
erate encirclement of schools of dolphin with nets. Without efforts to
protect them, they would be killed when the tuna was harvested.
The United States also invoked Article XX(g), which permits
measures that are "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption." ' The United
States stated that dolphins are an "exhaustible natural resource" and
that the measure was "in conjunction with" restrictions on domestic
production or consumption of tuna. Using language from Herring
and Salmon, the United States argued that the measures were "pri-
marily aimed at" rendering effective these same restrictions on do-
mestic fishing vessels. 74
The GATT panel ruled that the MMPA embargo failed to satisfy
the requirements of both Article XX subparagraphs (b) and (g)."'
First, with regard to Article XX(b), the panel held:
The United States had not demonstrated to the Panel-as required of the
party invoking an Article XX exception-that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives
through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular
through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements, which
72. Id.
73. Id. para. 3.40 (quoting GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g)).
74. See id. para. 3.41 (arguing the reason for enacting measures to conserve
natural resources).
75. See id. paras. 5.30-5.33 (analyzing the extra jurisdictionality of Article
XX). The panel in Tuna I asserts that Articles XX(b) and (g) have no extra juris-
dictional application. See id. para. 5.32. The extra-jurisdictional analysis made of
Article XX in Tuna I indicates the length to which GATT panels went in order to
limit the scope of Article XX. See id. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26,
paras. 5.30-5.33, for recognition that, in principle, international law and the GATT
allow countries to regulate beyond their territory.
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would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the
76
waters of many states and the high seas.
The panel interpreted the word "necessary" as used in subparagraph
(b) to mean that the measure must not only be the least-GATT-
inconsistent measure," but that the United States must have imposed
the measure after it exhausted all other options."
The panel rejected the United States' Article XX(g) argument
based on the failure of the MMPA embargo to satisfy the "primarily
aimed at" requirement of that subparagraph, which had been previ-
ously interpreted in Thailand-Cigarettes. The panel explained that
under the MMPA provisions, the "maximum incidental dolphin-
taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in
order to be able to export tuna to the United States was linked to and
based on the taking rate actually recorded for United States fisher-
men during that same period,"7 9 the embargo therefore cannot be
primarily aimed at conservation."0 According to the panel, "a limita-
tion on trade based on such unpredictable conditions could not be re-
garded as being primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins.""
In sum, the panel held that to successfully meet its burden of proof
under Article XX (b), a party must: (1) adopt the least-GATT-
inconsistent measure; (2) prove that it has exhausted all options be-
fore adoption of the measure; and (3) apply it in a manner that is
least-GATT-inconsistent, meaning that the treatment of domestic and
76. GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para. 5.28
77. Id. para. 5.28. The Appellate Body explained that:
[t]he United States linked the maximum incidental dolphin taking rate which Mexico
had to meet during a particular period in order to be able to export tuna to the United
States to the taking rate actually recorded for United States fishermen during the same
period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given
point of time, their policies conformed to the United States' dolphin protection stan-
dards. The Panel considered that a limitation on trade based on such unpredictable
conditions could not be regarded as necessary to protect the health or life of dolphins.
Id.
78. See id. para 5.33.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
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foreign parties must be identical. It is less clear what a country must
do in order to successfully meet its burden of proof with regard to
Article XX(g). What is known is that Article XX(g) was intended to
permit Members to "take trade measures primarily aimed at render-
ing effective restrictions on production or consumption within their
jurisdiction,"' 2 and any measure that creates "unpredictable condi-
tions" cannot be regarded as "primarily aimed at."'"
4. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna I")
The MMPA 4 resulted in another unadopted GATT panel decision
a few years later in Tuna H1.8" This time, however, the countries who
were affected under the "intermediary nation embargo ' provisions
of the MMPA filed the complaint.7 The MMPA provisions at issue
stated that intermediary nations that both import yellowfin tuna and
yellowfin tuna products, and export these same tuna products to the
United States, "must certify and provide reasonable proof that it has
not imported products subject to the direct prohibition within the
preceding six months."88 The MMPA prohibited intermediary nations
82. GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para. 5.31 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See generally GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26 (implying that the
MMPA had been amended and modified during the time period between the two
decisions, but the basic prohibitions had stayed intact).
85. Id.
86. See GATT Tuna I Report, supra note 26, para. 2.7 (explaining the embar-
goes established by the MMPA). The MMPA had two categories of embargo: pri-
mary nation embargo (which was the subject matter of Tuna I) and intermediary
nation embargo (which was the subject of Tuna I). See id. Under the primary na-
tion embargo, the MMPA prohibited imports into the United States of tuna or tuna
products harvested by a method that resulted in the incidental killing or serious
injury of marine mammals in excess of United States standards. See generally
GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26.
87. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26, par. 3.1 (listing the arguments
given by the EEC and the Netherlands as intermediary embargo nations, filing this
complaint against the United States).
88. Id. para. 2.12 (highlighting MMPA section 101(a)(2)(C)); see also id. para.
2.14 (noting that this provision was amended in 1992 after the intermediary em-
bargo provisions were interpreted by a United States court to mean that an inter-
mediary country had to itself prohibit tuna that was barred under the direct em-
bargo provisions of the MMPA).
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that failed to certify from exporting to the United States. The EEC
and the Netherlands, as intermediaries, argued that none of the Arti-
cle XX exceptions covered the embargo.89 The United States re-
sponded that the intermediary nation embargo was not a violation of
the GATT because it came within the scope of Article XX subpara-
graphs (b), (d), and (g). 90
The GATT panel held that Article XX(b) did not cover the inter-
mediary embargo provisions because they were not the least-GATT-
inconsistent in their implementation and therefore not "necessary" as
subparagraph (b) requires.9 ' The GATT panel asserted that the inter-
mediary nation embargo provisions prohibited imports from a coun-
try of any tuna, whether or not the particular tuna was harvested in a
manner that harmed or could harm dolphins, and whether or not the
country had tuna harvesting practices and policies that harmed or
could harm dolphins. As a result, the intermediary nation embargo
failed the least-GATT-inconsistent alternative test and was, there-
fore, not "necessary" for purposes of Article XX(b). 9 The panel con-
cluded that a measure cannot be considered "necessary" under Arti-
cle XX(b) if it is intended to "[f]orce other countries to change their
policies within their own jurisdictions and if it require[s] such
changes in order to be effective."93
The panel also rejected the United States argument with regard to
Article XX(d), which provides an exception from other GATT obli-
gations in cases where a violation is "necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with this [GATT]
89. See id. paras. 3.1 (a), (b) (explaining that MMPA, according to the EEC
and the Netherlands, was a violation of Article XI: 1 and did not qualify as border
adjustments under Article III).
90. See GATT, supra note 1, arts. XX (b), (d), (g).
91. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26, paras. 5.30-5.33 (stating further
that the panel disagreed with the prior panel in Tuna I that Article XX(b) cannot be
applied extra-jurisdictionally).
92. The panel used the same analysis for primary embargo provisions because
they prohibited imports from a country of any tuna, whether or not the particular
tuna was harvested in a way that harmed or could harm dolphins as long as the
practices and policies of that country were not comparable to that of the United
States. See id.
93. Id. para. 5.38.
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agreement." 94 The GATT panel limited the scope of subparagraph (d)
to cover only those laws or regulations which in themselves are justi-
fied. Furthermore, since the "primary embargo" provisions were not
justified under Article XX, 9' the panel concluded that the intermedi-
ary nation embargo cannot be justified under subparagraph (d) as
"necessary" to secure compliance with the laws or regulations that
imposed the primary embargo.i
The GATT panel articulated a three-step analysis in analyzing Ar-
ticle XX(g).97 The first step of the analysis asks whether the interme-
diary nation embargo was part of the policy to conserve exhaustible
natural resources. The second step considers whether the intermedi-
ary nation embargo provisions were "related to" conservation efforts
and made effective "in conjunction with" domestic production or
consumption.9" Finally, the third issue raised is whether the interme-
diate embargo provisions were applied in a manner, which would
constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail."
Applying this three-step analysis, the panel concluded that the in-
termediary nation embargo provisions of the MMPA satisfied the
94. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
95. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
96. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26, para. 5.41.
97. See id. para. 5.12 (setting forth the panel's three tier test).
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of which these provisions
were invoked fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural re-
sources.
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure for which the exception was be-
ing invoked-that is the particular trade measure inconsistent with the obligations un-
der the General Agreement-was "related to" the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources and whether it was made effective "in conjunction" with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption.
Third, it had to be determined whether the measure was applied in conformity with the
requirement set out in the preamble to Article XX, namely that the measure not be ap-
plied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or in a manner which
would constitute disguised restriction on international trade.
Id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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first step but not the second.' The GATT panel accepted the United
States view that a policy to conserve dolphins was a policy to con-
serve an exhaustible natural resource because such dolphin stocks
have the potential of being exhausted.1 The GATT panel, however,
applied the interpretation of prior panels in Tuna I and Herring and
Salmon by concluding that "relating to" is interpreted to mean "pri-
marily aimed at the conservation of natural resources" and "in con-
junction with" to be taken to mean "primarily aimed at rendering ef-
fective the restrictions on domestic production or consumption."'0 2
Furthermore, the GATT panel asserted that "primarily aimed at" re-
ferred not only to the purpose of the measure but also to the actual
effect of the measure on conservation of the natural resources. For
example, an assessment of the success of the measure in reaching its
conservation goals should be taken into account in determining
whether a provision meets the requirements of subparagraph (g). "3
As a result, the GATT panel held that "the prohibition on imports
of tuna into the United States taken under the intermediary nation
embargo could not, by itself, further the United States conservation
objectives."1'0 The panel reasoned that the intended "conservation"
effect could be achieved only if the primary nations that were the
targets of the primary nation embargo, and not the intermediary na-
tions, actually changed their policies or practices.0 5 The panel further
held that the primary embargo could not by itself further the United
States' conservation objectives because it prohibited the import of
any tuna "whether or not the particular tuna was harvested in a way
that harmed or could harm dolphins, as long as the country's tuna
harvesting practices and policies were not comparable to those of the
United States."' ' The panel concluded that measures such as the
100. See id. paras. 5.13-5.16 (implying that since the GATT panel found the in-
termediary embargo provisions were not applicable, it did not discuss the third
step).
101. See id. para. 5.13 (stating the reasoning used by the panel to recognize the
conservation of dolphins as an effort to conserve an exhaustible natural resource).
102. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26, para. 5.22.
103. Id.
104. Id. para. 5.23.
105. See id.
106. Id. para. 5.24.
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MMPA, which were implemented in order to force other countries to
change their policies and that were effective only if such changes oc-
curred, could not be primarily aimed at either conservation of an ex-
haustible natural resource or rendering effective restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption within the meaning of Article
The Panel's tone and analysis of Article XX in Tuna II were sig-
nificantly different from those employed in prior decisions. The
panel objected to the MMPA because of the impact of such a meas-
ure on the "objectives of the General Agreement.""" Specifically, the
panel refused to extend an exception to allow a trade measure aimed
at forcing other countries to change their policies "including policies
to protect living things."'0'9 According to the panel, if permitted under
Article XX, such measures would "seriously impair" the "objectives
of the General Agreement."' 1
Additionally, in Tuna I there is an explicit recognition of the im-
portance of the environment and, for the first time, a GATT panel re-
fers to the "objective of sustainable development:"
The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable development, which in-
cludes the protection and preservation of the environment, has been
widely recognized by the contracting parties to the General Agreement.
The Panel observed that the issue in this dispute was not the validity of
the environmental objectives of the United States to protect and conserve
dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its environmental ob-
jectives, the United States could impose trade embargoes to secure
changes in the policies which other contracting parties pursued within
their own jurisdiction.I
These words foreshadow a new era under the WTO. The dual objec-
tives of the trading system were recognized for the first time: free
trade on the one hand, and the objective of sustainable development,
including the protection and preservation of the environment, on the
other.
107. See id. para. 5.27.
108. See GATT Tuna II Report, supra note 26, para. 5.38.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. para. 5.42 (emphasis added).
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B. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX UNDER WTO/GATT 1994
The GATT panel decisions beginning with Herring and Salmon
and ending with Tuna II demonstrate an evolution in the analysis of
Article XX. In Herring and Salmon, Thailand-Cigarettes, and Tuna
I, the panels based their decisions on narrow interpretations of the
words "necessary," "related to," and "in conjunction with" in sub-
paragraphs (b), (d), and (g) of Article XX. Notably, there is no dis-
cussion in any of those decisions about the goals and policies that the
Article XX exceptions generally seek to promote and protect within
the multilateral trading system. For the first time, in Tuna II, the
panel refers to the "objectives of the General Agreement," the im-
portance of the "objective of sustainable development," and "the en-
vironment.""'
The WTO dispute settlement body ("DSB") has tackled Article
XX in two instances: Reformulated Gasoline"3 and Shrimp-Turtle. ,4
In both cases, the Appellate Body reversed the DSB panel's inter-
pretations of Article XX while upholding the final rulings."' The
Appellate Body expanded the application of Article XX by applying
the interpretative principles of public international law found in the
Vienna Convention."' These principles require that the terms of a
treaty be interpreted in good faith in light of their context and in light
of its purpose 7 and that the context and purpose of the treaty include
112. See id. para. 5.38.
113. See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 4; Reformulated
Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 2.
114. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4; Shrimp-Turtle Appellate
Report, supra note 3.
115. Under the DSU, the Appellate Body can only modify, reverse or uphold the
legal findings and conclusions of the panel. It cannot remand a decision. See Un-
derstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
17.13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 353, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
116. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6.
117. See id. The Convention states, in part:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose.
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its preamble"8 as well as the "preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion."'"9
1. United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline
In Reformulated Gasoline, Venezuela and Brazil brought a com-
plaint against the United States claiming that the regulations imple-
menting the United States Clean Air Act of 1990 ("CAA")'2'J violated
the United States' substantive obligations under the GATT 1994 and
were not justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994.'2' The spe-
cific regulation at issue was the baseline establishment method set
forth in the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") Regulation
of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline ("Gasoline Rule")'" promulgated pursuant to the
provisions of the CAA.'- Venezuela and Brazil specifically objected
to the application of different "baseline establishment methods" for
domestic refiners and foreign importers and refiners, which had the
effect of discriminating against the foreign importers or refiners.':2
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text... its preamble and annexes....
Id. art. 31.
118. See id.
119. Id. art. 32.
120. 42 U.S.C. sec. 7545(k) (1994). The CAA was aimed at reducing air pollu-
tion resulting from the combustion of gasoline. See also Reformulated Gasoline
Panel Report, supra note 4, paras. 2.1-2.13.
121. See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 3.1. Specifi-
cally, Venezuela and Brazil argued violation of Article I (most favored nation) and
Article III (national treatment) of GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade. See id.
122. 40 C.F.R. sec. 80 (1994).
123. See Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 2.5. The
Gasoline rule used 1990 data on the level of pollution from gasoline combustion
for both reformulated and conventional gasolines as baselines for determining
compliance with the CAA requirement that pollution levels should not exceed
1990 levels. See id.
124. Under the baseline establishment method set out in the Gasoline Rule, in-
dividual baselines were established for domestic refiners by using the quality data
and volume records of gasoline produced in 1990, or, in the alternative, if such
data was not available, an individual baseline was established by looking at the
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Venezuela and Brazil complained that the Gasoline Rule discrimi-
nated against foreigners by not allowing foreign refiners to use indi-
vidual baselines and by limiting the methods by which domestic im-
porters could calculate their baselines.'25 The United States
responded that the baseline establishment method of the Gasoline
Rule was not in violation of the GATT 1994, and that in the alterna-
tive, even if it was a violation, it fell within the scope of Article XX
subparagraphs (b), (d), and (g).126
The DSB panel held that the baseline establishment methods were
not consistent with Article 111:4 of the General Agreement and could
not be justified under subparagraphs (b), (d), and (g) of Article
XX. 127 The DSB panel's analysis of subparagraphs (b), (d), and (g)
was identical to the analysis of both adopted and unadopted GATT
panels, including Herring and Salmon, Thailand-Cigarettes, Tuna I,
and Tuna II. 2 8 The Gasoline Rule failed under subparagraph (b) of
domestic refiners post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or gasoline quality data and
then adjusting that in light of the refinery changes since 1990 to show what the
1990 gasoline composition would have been. For importers of foreign gasoline, in
the absence of an individual baseline based on 1990 records, a statutory baseline
was adopted. Importers of foreign gasoline were not allowed to use the two alter-
native methods which domestic refiners were allowed to use to determine their
baselines. In addition, the Gasoline Rule did not provide individual baselines for
foreign refiners, but rather restricted them to the statutory baseline. Venezuela and
Brazil based their complaint on the treatment of importers of foreign gasoline and
foreign refiners. See id. paras. 2.5-2.8.
125. See id. paras. 3.12-3.15. Venezuela and Brazil argued that the Gasoline
Rule violated Article I of the GATT because it allowed only an importer, which
was at the same time a foreign refiner, to establish an individual baseline, provided
that it imported in 1990 into the United States at least 75% of the gasoline pro-
duced in that refinery. See id. para. 3.5. As a result, the 75% rule granted an ad-
vantage to gasoline exported from certain third countries, thus violating Article I.
See id. Venezuela and Brazil further argued that by denying foreign refiners the
possibility of establishing an individual baseline, the Gasoline Rule violated Arti-
cle 111:4 because it accorded less favorable treatment to imported gasoline, both
reformulated and conventional, than to US gasoline. See id. para. 3.12.
126. See id. paras. 3.37, 3.39, 3.55, 3.58.
127. The panel held that the baseline establishment rule did not satisfy the re-
quirements of Article XX(b) because it was not "necessary to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health." Id. paras. 6.22-6.29. In addition, the panel found that
the baseline establishment rule was not justified under Article XX(d) as "necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions" of GATT. Id. paras. 6.30-6.33.
128. See, e.g., Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 4, paras. 6.24,
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Article XX because it was not the least-GATT-inconsistent measure.
It treated foreign refiners less favorably than domestic ones and, ac-
cording to the DSB panel, this discriminatory treatment was not
"necessary" to attain the policy objectives of the Gasoline Rule and
the CAA. 19 Subparagraph (d) did not cover the Gasoline Rule for the
same reasons that the MMPA failed under Tuna I' Subparagraph
(d), an exception for measures necessary to secure compliance with
laws and regulations that are not in violation of the GATT 1994,
cannot be invoked if the measure at issue itself has violated the
GATT 1994 and is not excepted under any other provision. Subpara-
graph (g) did not save the Gasoline Rule because the "less favorable
baseline establishment methods" applied to importers of foreign
gasoline was not "primarily aimed at" or "relating to" the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources."'
On appeal, the Appellate Body departed significantly from the
prior analysis of Article XX exceptions employed by the DSB panel.
Unfortunately, the scope of the Appellate Body decision is limited to
Article XX(g), which is the only exception that the United States ap-
6.37, 6.39, 6.40.
129. See id. paras. 6.21-6.29. The panel agreed that the policy to reduce air pol-
lution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was a policy within the range of
those concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health, see id.
para. 6.21, but that it was not "necessary" for the promotion of that policy that
"imported gasoline be effectively prevented from benefiting from as favorable
sales condition as were afforded by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a
product." Id. para. 6.22.
130. See discussion supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the failure of the MMPA in
Tuna 11).
131. According to the DSB panel, the baseline establishment method of the
Gasoline Rule was not justified under Article XX(g) because although clean air
was an exhaustible natural resource, there was:
no direct connection between less favourable treatment of imported gasoline that was
chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and the US objective of improving air qual-
ity in the United States .... [B]eing consistent with the obligation to provide no less
favourable treatment would not prevent the attainment of the desired level of conser-
vation of natural resources under the Gasoline Rule .... [T]he above-noted lack of
connection was underscored by the fact that affording treatment of imported gasoline
consistent with Article 111:4 obligations would not in any way hinder the United States
in its pursuit of its conservation policies ....
Reformulated Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 6.40 (emphasis added).
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pealed. '32 Applying a two-tier analysis to Article XX, the Appellate
Body first analyzed the baseline establishment rule under the re-
quirements of subparagraph (g) of Article XX, and then appraised
the implementation of the measure under the chapeau of Article
x.133
The Appellate Body reversed as an "error in law" the DSB panel
holding that the baseline establishment rules do not fulfill the re-
quirements of subparagraph (g). The Appellate Body held that the
baseline establishment rule, while it was inconsistent with GATT
Article 111:4, does fulfill the requirements of subparagraph (g) be-
cause the baseline establishment rule can be regarded as "primarily
aimed at" the conservation of natural resources for the purposes of
Article XX(g).' 34 While applying the "primarily aimed at" standard,
the Appellate Body asserted that there is nothing in the statute that
would indicate that either "related to" or "in conjunction with"
should be interpreted to mean "primarily aimed at."'33 This was a
significant departure from prior panel decisions and is a signal that
132. The Appellate Body noted:
The sharply limited scope of this appeal is underscored by noting the number of find-
ings which the Panel had made but which have not been appealed from by the United
States. Very briefly, the United States does not appeal from the findings or rulings
made by the Panel on, or in respect of... the applicability of Article XX(b) and Arti-
cle XX(d) of the General Agreement and of the TBT Agreement. Understandably, the
United States has also not appealed from the Panel's ruling that clean air is an ex-
haustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the General Agree-
ment.
Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 2, at 9-10.
133. See id. at 22.
134. See id. at 19.
135. The Appellate Body explained:
All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept the propriety and
applicability of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a
measure must be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources in order to fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Accordingly, we see no
need to examine this point further, save, perhaps, to note that the phrase "primarily
aimed at" is not itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for
inclusion or exclusion from Article XX(g).
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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the Appellate Body does not intend to continue on the narrow inter-
pretative path of prior panels with regard to Article XX(g).-'"
The Appellate Body also concluded that the baseline establish-
ment rules were "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production."' In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate
Body reversed prior interpretations of the GATT panels where the
requirement of "in conjunction with" was interpreted to establish "an
empirical effects test." As a result, in prior GATT decisions any dif-
ference in effect of the measure between foreign and domestic was
used to exclude a measure from coverage under subparagraph (g) of
Article XX.'38 The Appellate Body interpreted "in conjunction with"
as "a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restric-
tions, in the name of conservation."'" The Appellate Body stated that
Article XX(g) requires "even-handedness" and not "identity of
treatment," and so long as domestic restrictions were also subject to
equivalent restrictions, then the requirements of subparagraph (g) as
indicated by the words "in conjunction with" are satisfied. " ,
The Appellate Body then turned to the interpretation of the Article
XX chapeau and stated that while the requirements of the subpara-
graph (g) were applicable to the measure itself-i.e., the baseline
establishment rule-the chapeau "by its express terms" addresses
"the manner in which that measure is applied."' 4' In this regard, any
analysis that takes place under the chapeau should be independent of
the analysis used to determine a violation of the substantive provi-
sions of the GATT 1994. '4' The Appellate Body pointed out that by
136. In Shrimp-Turtle, there is no mention of the "primarily aimed at" require-
ment when interpreting Article XX(g). See discussion supra Part ll.B.2.
137. Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 2, at 21.
138. The Appellate Body stated, "We do not believe, finally, that the clause 'if
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption' was intended to establish an empirical 'effects test' for the availability
of Article XX(g) exception." Id.
139. Id. at 20.
140. Id. at20-21.
141. Id. at 22.
142. The Appellate Body stated:
In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion in Article
III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on
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applying the same standard that it used to find inconsistency with
Article III:4 to also find abuse of the exceptions, the DSB panel in
effect "empt[ied] the chapeau of its contents [and] deprive[d] the ex-
ceptions (a) to (j) of meaning.' 43 According to the Appellate Body,
such a recourse would "confuse the question of whether inconsis-
tency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate
question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that
inconsistency was nevertheless justified," and would have the effect
of "reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy
or inutility.""*' This approach would violate the principles of public
international law on the interpretation of treaties as stated in the Vi-
enna Convention. Interestingly, this is exactly what the GATT panel
in Thailand-Cigarettes had done.
The Appellate Body expanded the scope of Article XX by holding
that the Vienna Convention requires that each Article XX subpara-
graph imposes a different burden based on the different words in the
statute,145 and each subparagraph must be interpreted differently
based on the specific facts of each case. "[I]t does not seem reason-
able to suppose that WTO Members intended to require, in respect of
each and every category, the same kind or degree of connection or
relationship between the measure under appraisal and the state inter-
est or policy sought to be promoted or realized., 146 The Appellate
its head. Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided "less favour-
able treatment" under Article III:4 before the Panel examined "General Exceptions"
contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article
XX makes it clear that it is the "measures" which are to be examined under Article
XX(g), and not the legal finding of "less favourable treatment."
Id. at 16.
143. Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 2, at 20.
144. Id.
145. The Appellate Body stated:
Applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty ... are to be
given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and
purpose, the Appellate Body observes that the Panel Report failed to take adequate ac-
count of the words actually used by Article XX in its several paragraphs... "neces-
sary"-in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "essential"- in paragraph (j); "relating to"-in
paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "for the protection of"-in paragraph (f);"in pursuance
of"--in paragraph (h); and "involving"-in paragraph (i).
Id. at 17.
146. Id. at 18.
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Body maintained that Article XX should be read in the light and
purpose of the whole agreement-as the Vienna Convention re-
quires-and that analysis should be based on case-by-case applica-
tion of the relevant provisions of Article XX.1'4
Ultimately, in Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body was not
convinced that the anticipated administrative burden on the EPA in
determining individual baselines for foreign refiners would have
been so great as to justify a discriminatory and stricter treatment of
foreign refiners under the baseline establishment rule. 4 1 In this re-
spect, the Appellate Body agreed with the DSB panel that estab-
lished techniques and procedures exist that would have allowed the
EPA auditors to evaluate information given by foreign refiners in or-
der to establish individual baselines. 49 Applying the foregoing analy-
sis, the Appellate Body concluded that:
[t]he baseline establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their applica-
tion, constitute "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised restriction
on international trade." We hold, in sum, that the baseline establishment
rules, although within the terms of Article XX(g), are not entitled to the
justifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole.'
In its reversal of the DSB panel's analysis of Article XX(g), the
Appellate Body rejected the analysis of subparagraph (g), which had
been consistently used by the preceding GATT panels. In addition, it
justified its decision based on the facts of the case and not the statu-
tory interpretation of Article XX.' In fact, the Appellate Body went
147. See id.
148. The Appellate Body discussed alternatives that the United States could
have pursued:
These included the imposition of statutory baselines without differentiation as between
domestic and imported gasoline. This approach, if properly implemented, could have
avoided any discrimination at all. Among the other options open to the United States
was to make available individual baselines to foreign refiners as well as domestic re-
finers.
Id. at 25.
149. See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Report, supra note 2, at 27.
150. Id. at 29.
151. The Appellate Body noted:
We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States: to explore ade-
1999] 1161
AM. U. INTL L. REV.
to great lengths to make it explicitly clear that the basis for the af-
firmation of the DSB panel decision is narrow and should not be
viewed as a decision that holds trade liberalization goals above the
environment. Specifically, the Appellate Body stated:
It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this [de-
cision] does not mean. It does not mean, or imply, that the ability of any
WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, more gener-
ally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the
fact that Article XX of the General Agreement [GATT 1994] contains
provisions designed to permit important state interests including-the
protection of human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources-to find expression. ... Indeed, in the preamble to the
WTO Agreement and in the Decision on Trade and Environment, there is
specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of coordi-
nating policies on trade and the environment.1
5 2
As these words indicate, the Appellate Body in Reformulated Gaso-
line explicitly recognized its duty to balance Article XX interests
with the trade liberalization goals of the GATT 1994 in each case
that comes before it.
2. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products
Shrimp-Turtle grappled with yet another United States law: Sec-
tion 609 of Public Law 101-162 and its implementing regulations,
guidelines, and judicial rulings (collectively referred to as "Section
609").' Specifically, Section 609 prohibited the importation of cer-
tain shrimp and shrimp products into the United States that were
quately means, including in particular cooperation with the governments of Venezuela
and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justification by the
United States in rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the
costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines.
In our view, these two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to
determine that a violation of Article 111:4 had occurred in the first place.
Id. at28.
152. Id. at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
153. Endangered Species Act of 1973, sec. 609, 16 U.S.C. secs. 1531, 1537
(1989); see also Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 2.7 (discussing
Section 609).
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harvested with commercial fishing technology that "'may adversely
affect certain sea turtles, [an endangered species.]' "
Section 609 exempted certified shrimp harvesting nations from the
import ban."5 Pursuant to the law, the United States Secretary of
State grants certification under two conditions. First, certification is
granted to countries with a fishing environment that does not pose a
threat to the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp
harvesting.16 Second, certification is granted to those harvesting na-
tions that "provide documentary evidence of the adoption of a regu-
latory program... that is comparable to the United States pro-
gram."'57 This condition is fulfilled when "the average rate of
incidental taking of sea turtles by their vessels is comparable to that
of the United States vessels."'5'
In 1991, 1993, and 1996 Guidelines were issued pursuant to Sec-
tion 609.' As a result of these Guidelines, the United States held
special negotiations with certain countries in the wider Carib-
bean/Western Atlantic region regarding their shrimp harvesting
techniques.'16 The 1996 Guidelines provided that in order to obtain
154. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, par. 2.7.
155. See id. paras. 2.11, 2.16 (addressing the existence of a certification proce-
dure and listing countries that are currently certified); see also Endangered Species
Act, supra note 153, sec. 609 (b)(2) (setting forth certification requirements).
156. See Pub. L. No. 101-162, sec. 609(b)(2)(A) (codified at 16 U.S.C. sec.
1537); see also Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 2.14 (reiterating
section 609(b) certification requirements).
157. Id. sec. 609(b)(2)(A) & (B).
158. Endangered Species Act, supra note 153, sec. 609(b)(2)(B) (emphasis
added); see also Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 2.14 (delineating
the second requirement for certification); Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra
note 3, para. 4.
159. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, paras. 2.8-2.9, 2.11.
160. Under the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines, the United States limited the geo-
graphical scope of Section 609 import ban to countries in the wider Carib-
bean/Western Atlantic region, and granted those countries a three year phase-in
period. See id. para. 2.8. In 1995, however, the United States Court of International
Trade ("CIT") held that the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines violated Section 609 by
limiting the geographical scope "to shrimp harvested in the wider Carib-
bean/[W]estem Atlantic region and directed the Department of State.. ." to extend
the ban world wide by May 1, 1996. Id. para. 2.10 (cited in Earth Island Institute v.
Warren Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (CIT 1995)).
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certification under Section 609, a harvesting nation must require use
of Turtle Excluder Devices ("TEDs") that are "comparable in effec-
tiveness to those used in the United States.' 6' Furthermore, in order
to determine acceptability of foreign programs, a harvesting nation's
"average incidental take rate will be deemed comparable if the har-
vesting nation requires use of TEDs in a manner comparable to that
of the [United States] program [and] includes a credible enforcement
effort that includes monitoring for compliance and additional sanc-
tions." 62
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand complained that Section
609 violated Articles XI: 1 and XIII: 1 of the GATT 1994, and was
not justified under Article XX exceptions.'63 The United States re-
sponded that Section 609 did nothing more than impose the same re-
quirements on foreign shrimp trawlers that were already imposed
domestically, including mandated use of sea-turtle safe commercial
fishing technology. '64 Furthermore, the measure was justified under
Article XX(g) or, in the alternative, Article XX(b) of the GATT
1994.165
The DSB panel held that the United States' import ban on shrimp
and shrimp products on the basis of Section 609 was inconsistent
161. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 2.12.
162. Id. para. 2.14. The 1996 Guidelines provide that the regulatory program
may be in the form of regulations, or may, in certain circumstances, take the form
of a voluntary arrangement between the industry and the government. See id. Fur-
thermore, the 1996 Guidelines require that all shrimp imported into the United
States contain a Shrimp Exporter's Declaration form attesting that the shrimp were
harvested either in the waters of a nation currently certified under Section 609, or
"under condition that do not adversely affect sea turtles." Id. para. 2.11.
163. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, paras. 1.1, 3.1 (delineating Sec-
tion 609's alleged violations of different articles in the GATT 1994).
164. In 1987, regulations issued under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 re-
quired United States trawlers to use approved Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) or
tow-time restrictions in specified areas of shrimp harvesting with significant sea
turtle mortality. See id. para. 2.6. These rules, once they became effective in 1990,
were amended to mandate TED use to all areas and all times where there is a sig-
nificant likelihood that shrimp trawling will interact with sea turtles. See id.
165. The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX is limited to XX(g) without
discussion of XX(b). Based on the United States submission, the Appellate Body
reasoned that it only needed to look at subparagraph (b) if the measure had not
fallen under subparagraph (g). See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3,
para. 24.
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with GATT Article XI:1, and could not be justified under Article
XX.'66 In reaching this conclusion, the DSB panel first analyzed Sec-
tion 609 under the chapeau of Article XX. The DSB panel concluded
that Section 609 fell outside the scope of Article XX because "even
though the situation of turtles is a serious one, we consider that the
United States adopted measures which, irrespective of their envi-
ronmental purpose, were clearly a threat to the multilateral trading
system."' 67 The threat to the multilateral trading system arises from
the fact that if other countries adopted the same type of unilateral
measure as adopted by the United States, it would undermine the
multilateral trading system.
68
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's analysis of
Article XX, but upheld the ultimate ruling.'6" The Appellate Body
stated that Section 609 was within the scope of Article XX of the
GATT 1994, and that the measure did qualify under subparagraph
(g) of Article XX. It held, however, that the implementation of Sec-
tion 609 failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article
XX. Once again, the Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX is
more significant than the final ruling.
The Appellate Body made it clear that any analysis of Article XX
requires two steps. The first step requires an analysis of the measure
in question under a subparagraph. If the measure is justified under
the subparagraph of Article XX, the second step requires an analysis
166. Id. para. 7.62.
167. Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3, para. 12, quoting Shrimp-
Turtle Panel Report, supra note 4, para. 7.61.
168. See generally Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3, para. 122.
169. Equally significant, the Appellate Body reversed the panel's finding that
accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources is incom-
patible with the provisions of the dispute settlement understanding ("DSU"). See
id. paras. 100-110. The Appellate Body held that the word "seek" in DSU Article
11, which states that panels can seek information outside the parties, should not be
read in "too literal a manner." Id. para. 107. The Appellate Body stated:
authority to seek information is not properly equated with a prohibition on accepting
information which has been submitted without having been requested by a panel. A
panel has the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject informa-
tion and advice submitted to it, whether requested bY the panel or not.
Id. para. 108.
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of the manner of implementation of the measure under the Article
XX chapeau. 7'
The Appellate Body held that Section 609 did satisfy the require-
ments of subparagraph (g) because the sea turtles are "exhaustible
natural resources.' 171 It further held that although the measure was
unilateral and certification was based on the adoption of the same
policies and laws as the United States, it was still "related to" con-
servation of the sea turtles, and it was made "in conjunction with re-
striction on domestic production.
1 72
The Appellate Body categorically rejected the DSB panel's argu-
ment that a unilateral measure, such as Section 609, falls outside the
scope of Article XX.' 3 The Appellate Body repeated its analysis of
Article XX in Reformulated Gasoline, stating that the meaning and
scope of Article XX, both in terms of the chapeau and the subpara-
170. The Appellate Body stated that the panel had erred in looking at the cha-
peau first, as it must fit a measure under one or more of the exceptions prior to
looking at the introductory provision. See id. para. 119. "The sequence of steps in-
dicated... in the analysis of a claim of justification under Article XX reflects, not
inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of
Article XX." Id. para. 119.
171. Id. paras. 132-134.
172. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g). The Appellate Body held that:
[i]n its general design and structure. . . Section 609 is not a simple, blanket prohibition
of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences ... of the
mode of harvesting employed.... Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not
disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of
protection and conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in principle, reasona-
bly related to the ends. The means and ends relationship between Section 609 and the
legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is ob-
servably a close and real one, a relationship that is every bit as substantial as that
which we found in United States-Gasoline between the EPA baseline establishment
rules and the conservation of clean air in the United States.
Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3, para. 141.
173. In response to this argument the Appellate Body stated:
[i]t appears to us, however, that conditioning access to a Member's domestic market
on whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally
prescribed by the importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of
measures falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Arti-
cle XX.
Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3, para. 121.
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graphs, depends upon not only the measure at issue, but also the sub-
paragraph in question.
The standards established in the chapeau are, moreover, necessarily broad
in scope and reach: the prohibition of the application of a measure "in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustilfable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail" or as
"a disguised restriction on international trade." When applied in a par-
ticular case [Article XX], the actual contours and contents of these stan-
dards will vary as the kind of measure under examination varies. What is
appropriately characterizable as "arbitrary discrimination" or "unjustifi-
able discrimination," or as a "disguised restriction on international trade"
in respect of one category of measures, need not be so with respect to an-
other group or type of measures. The standard of "arbitrary discrimina-
tion," for example, under the chapeau may be different for a measure that
purports to be necessary to Protect public morals than for one relating to
the products of prison labor. 74
As the above language indicates, the Appellate Body adopted a case-
by-case balancing approach to Article XX, arguing that with each
case the analysis changes. Often times the meaning of a word, such
as "necessary," can vary depending upon the type of measure and the
specific subparagraph of Article XX involved.
The Appellate Body also rejected the United States' argument that
"discrimination between countries," as stated in the chapeau, is justi-
fiable if the policy goal is "conservation." It held that the rationale or
justification for a measure is not relevant to analysis under the cha-
peau, but is only relevant to the analysis under the subparagraph. In
this case, the Appellate Body held that although, as enacted, Section
609 does not require discrimination between countries, the imple-
mentation of Section 609 does result in "unjustifiable discrimina-
tion" between countries where the same conditions prevail."' 5 The
Appellate Body held that the discrimination is unjustifiable for two
reasons. First, the implementation of the Section 609 "requires other
WTO members to adopt a regulatory program that is not merely
comparable, but rather essentially the same, as that applied to the
United States shrimp trawl vessels."'' 6 Second, the Appellate Body
174. See id. para. 120.
175. See id. para. 161.
176. Id. para. 163. The Appellate Body further noted:
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reasoned that shrimp caught in uncertified countries under Section
609 would be excluded from the United States, even if the commer-
cial shrimp trawl vessels used TEDs comparable in effectiveness to
those utilized in the United States. 77 The Appellate Body concluded
that Section 609 did not meet the requirements of the "arbitrary and
unjustified discrimination" test under the Article XX chapeau be-
cause the manner of implementation of the law indicates that it is
"more concerned with effectively influencing WTO members to
adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that
applied by the United States to its domestic shrimp trawlers"'7 than
the declared policy of protecting and conserving sea turtles.179
Again, as in Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body went to
great lengths to assure all WTO Members that exceptions can and
should justify measures, such as Section 609, if implemented cor-
rectly.
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not
decided in this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and pres-
ervation of the environment is of no significance to the Members of the
WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that
are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect en-
dangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And
we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together
bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in
It may be quite acceptable for a government, in adopting and implementing a domestic
policy, to adopt a single standard applicable to all its citizens throughout that country.
However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO member to
use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same
comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force
within that Member's territory, without taking into consideration different conditions
which may occur in the territories of those other Members.
Id. para. 164.
177. See id. para. 165.
178. Id.
179. Just as in Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle is
likewise concerned that the United States failed to engage in cross-border negotia-
tions with countries affected by the Section 609, in violation of Section 609, which
required international negotiations. See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra
note 3, para. 166.
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other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise
protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do." o
It is evident from the foregoing language that the Appellate Body
recognizes the growing importance of the environment, sustainable
development, and Article XX within the WTO system.
Ill. WHAT COURSE WILL THE APPELLATE BODY
TAKE IN THE FUTURE: FREE TRADE OR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
As we enter the next millenium the multilateral trading system is
faced with an important challenge. Can the WTO system and its dis-
pute settlement mechanism survive and maintain its legitimacy if it
continues to value "free trade" above all other concerns? The answer
is no, it cannot.
The question that is then raised is: when, and under what circum-
stances, can Article XX interests have preeminence over the market
access goals of the multilateral trading system? The Appellate Body
does not provide a clear answer to this question. Instead, the Appel-
late Body proposes a balancing test to be applied on a case-by-case
basis between Article XX interests involved and the GATTIWTO
goals of market access and trade liberalization. However, by apply-
ing the interpretative principles of the Vienna Convention to Article
XX the Appellate Body provides interpretative guidance as to meth-
odology that should be used as part of any balancing test. Appellate
Body decisions in Shrimp-Turtle and Refornulated Gasoline provide
the following interpretative guidance for balancing Article XX inter-
ests:
First, a measure must be initially analyzed under one or more
subparagraphs of Article XX. If the measure fulfills the re-
quirements of an Article XX subparagraph then it should be
analyzed under the chapeau for whether it is "applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination . .. , or a disguised restriction on international
trade." &'
180. Id. para. 185.
181. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
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Second, both the requirements of the chapeau and each subpara-
graph of Article XX are fact-specific and therefore vary ac-
cording to the facts of the case and the measure in question.
Third, the requirements of the chapeau change depending upon
the subparagraph involved and the specific facts of the case.
This means that the same subparagraph can be interpreted dif-
ferently depending on the case.
Fourth, in fulfilling the requirements of the chapeau of Article
XX, the extent to which the international community is con-
sulted prior to implementation of a measure must be taken into
account, as well as, the extent to which attempts have been
made to minimize the negative impact of the measure on an in-
ternational level.
Last, balancing the objectives of sustainable development and
the protection of the environment is required under the preamble
of the WTO Agreement because the preamble "informs" the
GATT 1994 and Article XX as well as the other covered agree-
ments."2
Given the foregoing interpretations of Article XX, the Appellate
Body can uphold a GATT-inconsistent measure as justified under
Article XX without necessarily threatening the integrity of the mul-
tilateral trading system. The Appellate Body must be encouraged to
seize an appropriate opportunity to uphold an Article XX measure.
The United States government, environmental groups, and the de-
velopment community must have patience with the WTO dispute
settlement system. The United States has played a pivotal role in the
evolution of Article XX from its drafting history to the present.18'
The drafting history of Article XX indicates that the United States
has historically supported the policies and interests contained in Ar-
ticle XX, and in particular Article XX(g)."' Furthermore, the process
of balancing competing and equally legitimate interests on a case-by-
182. See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 3, para. 129; see also Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, preamble, Apr. 15,
1994, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 7,33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
183. See supra Part I (discussing the drafting history of Article XX).
184. See WILCOX, supra note 22, at 182.
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case basis is very compatible with the United States' model of adju-
dication. But the WTO has 134 members, many of which are far
more suspicious of Article XX and its exceptions and must therefore
proceed cautiously.' The Appellate Body's analysis of Article XX
generally, and subparagraph (g) in particular, in Reformulated Gaso-
line and Shrimp-Turtle, indicates that although supporters of Article
XX interests may have lost the battle, the prospects look good for
winning the war.
185. Some developing countries have already asserted that they will not tolerate
"eco-imperialism" through the WTO DSU. See, e.g., Cato Center for Trade Policy
Studies Real Audio and Video Archives, The WITO 's Shrimp-Turtle Decision: Free
Trade v. the Environment? (visited Dec. 8, 1998) <http:/Iwww.frectrade.org/
realmedia/realmedia.html> (providing comments by Kanthi Tripathi, Minister of
Commerce Embassy of India regarding the sentiment of some developing coun-
tries against "eco-imperialism" through the WTO DSU).
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